Directions (Q. 1-15): Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words are given in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions.
In the din and cackle of the communal eruptions in Gujarat, neither the media nor the intellectuals have heard the cry of protest and anger from the Army on being called in to douse communal fires. This, especially at a time when it was deployed in Operation Parakram, the country’s biggest mobilisation of the armed forces since 1971 to teach Pakistan a lesson if it did not stop cross-border terrorism. But war and communalism do not mix in India. Many lessons have emerged from Godhra to Gujarat carnage. The one that will easily be forgotten is the abysmal failure of the police and central paramilitary forces to control internal conflict, namely communal violence, and the alacrity with which the Army is requisitioned. The Army has two tasks: to defend the country against external aggression is its primary mission. There is a secondary task: assist state and Central governments in maintaining internal security as well as providing relief during natural calamities. The secondary role is fast becoming the primary one as the line between external and internal security has got blurred. The intention of any democratic republic must be the prevention of the use of its fighting forces against its own people. The Army is a weapon of last resort. The debate on the employment of the Army in internal security duties, especially communally charged situations, was joined in 1984 after Operation Blue Star which led to the first organised mutiny in the armed forces in independent India. It was felt that the armed forces, especially the Army, being the true model in the country of nationalism and secularism, be insulated against tasks of internal security to avoid its politicisation and communalisation. The second debate on the internal security role of the Army — whether it or some other force should fight insurgency and terrorism — surfaced after the renewal of the proxy war in J&K in 1990. Thirty-six battalions of the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) were raised under Army control to reduce the Army’s involvement in its secondary tasks. Thirty additional battalions of RR are under raising which will help the Army fight externally-supported internal conflict—but not free it altogether. The human tragedy in Gujarat timed with Operation Parakram is a good time to draw red lines for the Army’s spiralling induction into situations of internal security. And keeping the Army out of communal incidents must become a rule rather than the exception. The Lakshman rekha was drawn with the blood of its soldiers in the Golden Temple and must be inviolate. It will be useful to recall that during the Babri Masjid standoff between 1990 and 1992, the Army, though located at Ayodhya, behaved to a pattern. On October 30, 1990, it refused requisitioning by the Commissioner of Faizabad even after police firing, hundreds dead and communal rioting. On December 6, 1992, the same brigade at Ayodhya, this time not requisitioned, refused to budge to save the Babri Masjid even when it had prior information that demolition would take place. Rightly or wrongly, the Army did not act on both occasions as it had taken a policy decision after Blue Star not to communalise its rank and file.
1. Which of the following is not among the tasks of our Army?
1) To protect the sovereignty of the nation
2) To help maintain law and order in the nation when needed
3) To attack our enemy nations and seize their territories
4) To indulge in rescue and relief works during natural disasters
5) None of these
2. What does the author mean by saying “The Army is a weapon of last resort.”?
1) The Army is helpless at certain times.
2) The Army is the only effective institution.
3) The Army should never be used in internal matters.
4) The Army is a force to reckon with.
5) None of these
3. Why is the secondary role of the Army becoming its primary role?
1) Because the line of demarcation between external and internal security has become vague
2) Because the line of demarcation between external and internal security has vanished
3) Because the line between external and internal security has overlapped
4) Because the line between external and internal security has diminished
5) None of these
4. Which of the following is true in the context of the passage?
1) Central paramilitary forces were able to control communal violence during Gujarat carnage.
2) Babri Masjid was demolished even though the Army tried its best to save it.
3) It has been proved that the Army is a communal force.
4) The Army is seen as a true model in secular India.
5) None of these
5. What message does the first organised mutiny in the armed forces give?
1) The armed forces should not be used against their will.
2) The armed forces are not effective at all times.
3) The armed forces should not be used to tackle communal strife.
4) The armed forces may turn hostile at times.
5) None of these
6. Why did the Army, despite being stationed at Ayodhya, refuse to save the Babri Masjid?
1) Because it was not in its jurisdiction
2) Because it was a matter of law and order
3) Because it was not prepared to tackle the gravity of the matter
4) Because it wanted to keep away from communally sensitive situation
5) None of these
7. Which of the following is false in the context of the passage?
1) When the Babri Masjid was being demolished the Army was not in the scene.
2) The Army can deal with communal issues with ease and without any repercussion.
3) To avoid its politicisation, the Army should be prevented from being used in matters of internal security.
4) The Army should be called for only when all the other options fail.
5) None of these
8. What do you mean by the phrase “to draw red lines”, as used in the passage?
1) to challenge
2) to argue
3) to stop
4) to reverse
5) None of these
9. What does the author want to convey through this passage?
1) The Army should tackle all the odds surrounding our country.
2) The Army should be used to deal mainly with external security.
3) Communal violence needs to be tackled through effective policing.
4) Failure in internal security has nothing to do with the Army.
5) None of these
Directions (Q. 10-12): Choose the word which is same in meaning as the word given in bold as used in the passage.
10. AGGRESSION
1) strife 2) disturbance 3) threat 4) peril 5) attacking
11. RESORT
1) option 2) action 3) solution 4) strike 5) experiment
12. MUTINY
1) indiscipline 2) war 3) quarrel 4) rebellion 5) infighting
Directions (Q. 13-15): Choose the word which is opposite in meaning of the word given in bold as used in the passage.
13. DOUSE
1) fume 2) heat 3) ignite 4) engulf 5) rage
14. ALACRITY
1) promptness 2) tardiness 3) idleness 4) bewilderness 5) sadness
15. BLURRED
1) confused 2) stronger 3) emphatic 4) popular 5) distinct
Regards
Team ExamPundit
This post was last modified on November 27, 2017 8:56 am